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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HEIDEMARIE FOULGER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16, 909· 
JOHN C. FOULGER~ 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE.OF THE CASE 
'I'h is appeal is from an order by the Honorable Dav id Sam 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, modifying the nroperty 
settlement of a divorce decree. The original qecree was 
entered by the Honorable George E. Ballif on October 29, 
1975, in the sam~ court. An Order to Show Cause and Affidavit 
in Re Modification of Decree of Divorce was filed by the 
plaintiff-respondent in Novembei, 1979, and ~ hearing was 
held by the Court on December 18, 1979. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 4, 1980, the trial court found paragrap~ 5, 
the property settlement in the original divorce decree, to 
be "inherently unfair," (R.20) and therefore modified the 
division of property between the parties. In its findings 
of fact, the Court noted changes of circumstances sufficient 
to justify such modification. (R.20) The child support 
·provision of the original decree was also modified but no 
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objection to this was made by the defendant-appellant. This 
appeal is taken solely from the order moditying the property 
settlement portion of the decree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APEAt 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial 
court's order modifying the property settlement. Plaintiff-
respondent seeks an order from this Court remanding the 
matter to the trial court to consider awarding plaintiff-
respondent additional attorney's fees for defending this 
appeal and an order affirming the trial court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 29, 1975, a divorce decree was granted to 
the plaintiff-respondent, Heidemarie Foulger, hereinafter 
referred to as respondent, and the defendant-appellant, John 
C. Foulger, hereinafter referred to as appellant. The 
parties used one attorney at the time of the initial proceeding 
although it appears that the appellant had talked to his 
present counsel prior to arranging to meet with Attorney 
Heber Grant Ivins who handled the original divorce (R.86). 
At the time the parties appeared in Mr. Ivins' office, the 
appellant dictated the terms of the Stipulation (R.99) and 
the parties agreed ·to allow the respondent to go forward and 
obtain the divorce. 
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce created an inequit-
able and unjust division of the equity in the parties' home. 
It awarded all right, title and interest in and to the real· 
property and residence to the respondent subject to a partially 
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defined and ever increasing equitable lien in favor of the 
appellant. Paragraph 5 of the Decree had the effect of 
requiring respondent to make all payments including the 
h6use payment, taxes, insurance, repairs ~nd upkeep on.the 
home, while permitting the appell~nt to continue to share in 
the increasing equity in the home brought about by paym~nts 
made by the respondent and the inflationary economy. (R.10,11) 
I 
Furthermore, any improvements to the home made and paid for 
by the respondent, were automatically shared on a 50-50 
basis by the appellant without any contribution on his part. 
Paragraph 5 of the original Decree which was modified 
by the· trial court in the proceeding from which this appeal 
was taken reads as follows: 
5. The plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, 
title and interest in and to the real property 
and residence at 195 Nbrth 7th East, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah, described as follows, to wit: 
Commencing at NE corner of Lot 1, Block 43, 
Plat "A", Pl~asant Grove City Survey1 thence 
South 111.10 feet; thence West 110.60 feet; 
thence North 111.10 feet; thence East 110.10 
feet to beginning. 
Subject, however, to a lien on said premises in 
·behalf of the defendant equal to fifty percent 
(50%) of the amount received from any sale in 
excess of $17,000.00 which is the purchase price 
of said residence. Defendant is further awarded 
a first option to purchase said residence in the 
event of sale and apply his equity upon said 
purchase price. Plaintiff is hereby granted the 
right to reside in said residence as long as 
she desires, but in the event of sale, the above 
formula shall apply. 
The trial court found that the property settlement was 
"inherently unfair" (R.19,20) and that there had been material 
-3-
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cnanges in circumstances which further justified the moJif icdtion 
of the property settlement paragraph (R.20,21). These 
material changes in circumstances included the fact that 
since the date of the Decree, respondent had paid all monthly 
payments, taxes and insurance associated with the house 
totalling $8,544.00 (R.20). In addition, respondent had 
expended some $2,000.00 in improvements to the property 
(R.21) and contemplates making additional improvements to 
the home (R.61). Respondent has been solely responsible for 
the maintenance, upkeep and repairs to the home for the past 
two or three years although appellant assisted with repairs 
and upkeep for approximately two years after the divorce 
(R.6i). 
Furthermore, appellant attempted to justify paragraph 5 
on the basis that he was fearful that the respondent would 
take the parties' minor children and return to her native 
Germany following the divorce and he wanted to have something 
that would induce her to remain. here (R.15,78). Upon cross-
examination, however, appellant conceded that there was only 
one time that the parties even discussed the possibility of 
respondent returning to Germany and that was several months 
prior to the divorce (R.86). Respondent denied that the 
possibility of her returning to Germany was. ever discussed 
or that she had ever indicated she wanted to leave Utah 
County (R.99). 
The trial court specifically found that the circumstances 
had changed from the time of the Decree and that there no 
-4-
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longer existed any possibility that the respondent would retu~ 
to Germany with the children (R.20). Respondent had not lived 
in Germany for more than sixteen. years, she had become a 
naturalized U.S. citizen and has _obtained full-time employment 
with the Alpine School District teaching U.S. History and 
German (R.20). The Court also found that the respondent has 
expressed no desire to return to Germany and~ in fact, 
indicated that she wanted to remain here in the United 
States and that her children are American citizens (R.20). 
Therefore~ on February 4, 1980, the trial court made an 
equitable modification of the property settlement (Paragraph 
5), granting appellant a lien on the property equal to one-
half of the equity value of the home at the time of the 
divorce which was computed to be one-half of $20,000.00, 
plus interest on the lien at the rate of eight percent (8%) 
per annum (R.21,22). 
POIWr I 
IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THE COURT HAS POWER TO 
MAKE MODIFICATIONS OR REVISIONS OF A PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT MORE JUST AND 
EQUITABLE. 
In equitable proceedings such as divorce, the court has 
reserved to it by statute the right to take measures to 
insure that its judgment is fair, and will remain so. Each 
court is given the power to make subsequent modifications 
and to reconsider a divorce decree whenever inequities or 
oversights come about. In Utah, such proceedings are governed 
by U.C.A. 30-3-5, which states in pertinent part: 
_r:._ 
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..• The court shall have continui!!.9_ 
jurisd1ct1on to make subsequenLChanges, 
or new orders with respect to the support 
and maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of children and their support and mainten-
ance or the distribution of property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary • • • 
(Emphasis added.) 
This section was designed to empower a court that had 
granted a decree of divorce and awarded alimony or had made 
distribution of property, to later increase or decrease 
alimony or to change.the distribution of property to insure 
justice bet~een the parties. Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah2d 329, 
437 P.2d 684 (1968); Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah2d 332, 445 
P.2d 701 (1968); Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d 136 (Utah, 
1975); Mitchell~~ Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974)~ 
This general rule was stated by the Utah Supreme Court as 
follows: 
When a divorce is decreed, the court shall 
make such order in relation to the children 
and property of the parties as may be just 
and equitable. Pr.ovided further, that when 
it shall appear to the court at a future 
time that it would be for the interest of 
the parties concerned that a change should 
be effected in regard. to the former disposal 
of children or distribution of property, the 
court shall have power to make such changes 
as will be conducive to.the best interests 
of all parties concerned. (Emphasis added) 
Whitmore v. Harden, 3 Utah 121, l P.465 
(1882), cited as recently as 1969 in Harrison 
v. Harrison, 22 utah2d 180, 450 P.2d 457 (1969). 
Furthermore, when the p~rties have stipulated to a 
certain property settlement, the court does not thereby lose 
the right to make such modifications or changes thereafter 
as may be requested by either party. Callister v. Callister, 
-6-
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1 utah2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 {1953); Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 
196, 139 P.2d 222 (1943); Barraclough v. ~arracloµgh, 100 
Utah 196, 111 P.2d 792 (1941). 
The trial court, then, has the power to modify and 
alter a judgment whenever it will render the decision 
more just-and equitable for-the parties- involved. If, upon 
consideration of the circumstances and conditions of a 
particular case, the division of property by the court seems 
inequitable, the court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
needed modifications and revisions of the settlement. With 
reference to U.C.A. 30-3-5, the Utah Supreme court in 
Iverson v. tverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah, 1974)~ stated that 
the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to make such 
subsequent changes with respect to distribution of divorced 
parties' property as "shall be reasonable and necessary." 
In the case at bar, the property settlement described 
in paragraph 5 of the original divorce _decree clearly pre-
sented problerns--it was inequitable and in need of revision. 
The settlement granted the respondent, Mrs. Foulger, all 
right, title and interest to the property, subject to a lien 
on the premises in behalf of the appellant equal to 50 
percent of the amount received from any sale in excess of 
$17,000.00, which was the purchase price of the residence 
and remaining mortgage obligation at the time of the De·cree 
(R.6). The appellant was further awarded a first option to 
purchase th~ residence in the event of sale, and apply his 
equity upon the purchase price (R.6,7). 
-7-
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For more than four years, Mrs. Foulger made .111 of the 
payments on the house, totalling in excess of $6,384.00, 
(R.10), paid increasing property taxes and insurance in 
excess of $2,160.00 (R.10), and paid for or performed all 
upkeep and made major improvements to the residence, increasing 
its value {R.10). Furthermore, she desired to make additional 
improvements in the home, namely, insulating and finishing 
the basement in order to reduce heating costs. The appellant, 
however, made no financial contribution to the property 
after the divorce decree was granted (R.10), yet the original 
decree allowed him to share in and benefit from any ongoing 
appreciation in value which accrued to the property. The 
lower court found this settlement to be "inherently unfair," 
and therefore modified paragraph 5 (R.20). 
The revised property settlement grants a lien on the 
premises in favor of the appellant for one-half of the 
appreciation of the home at the time of the divorce in 
excess of $17,000.00. The court valued the home at $37,000.00 
at the time of the divorce, and accordingly the amount of 
the appellant's lien is one-half of $20,000.00, or $10,000.00 
(R.16). The modification further awarded the appellant 
interest on the lien at the rate of eight percent (8%) per 
annum, commencing from the date of the ruling (R.16). This 
modification was clearly necessary in order to make the 
settlement equitable and to insure substantial justice 
between the parties. Furthermore, such modification was 
entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. The 
-8-
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particular changes or modifications ne~ded to make a divorce 
decree more equitable are always a matter of discretion: 
The trial court granting a decree of divorce 
has continuing jurisdiction over the parties 
with regard to the decree, enabling it to 
make such subsequent modifications as are 
equitable, and the breadth of discretionary 
power given.the trial court in the initial 
determination of property d1v1s1on extends 
in equal measure to the subsequent.mod1f1-: 
cations. (Emphasis added) Mccrary v. McCr~ry, 
599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1979). 
See also Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 
(1930); Pinney·v~-Pinney, 66 utah 602, 245 P. 329 (1926}; 
Op~nshaw v~ 6~ensha~, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932); and 
Buzzo v. Bu~zo, 45 Utah 625 148 P. 362 (1915). 
A trial-court may, ·therefore, use its broad discretionary 
powers in the modification of a property settlement, and 
before a decision to modify can be reversed~ the appellant 
has the burden of proving that the trial court abused that 
discretion. Christensen v; Christensen, 21 Utah2d 263, 444 
P.2d 511 (1968); Knapp v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 8 
Utah2d 220, 332 P. 2d 662 ( 1958). In the case at bar,. appellant 
must show that the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the trial court's decision and that modification constituted 
substantial, reversible error. Clearly, the appellant has 
failed to meet this burden--all of the evidence indicates 
that the trial judge was entirely fair in his decision to 
modify. Since no abuse of discretion can be shown, therefore, 
the modification must be upheld. 
The more btoad and general rule is that the trial court 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in any equitable matter has a wide range of discretion to 
make such orders as may be just--including the review of 
previous orders. See 27 Am.Jur.2d 627, Equity §102. Sound 
discretion is the controlling guide of judicial action in 
every phase of a suit in equity. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 
294 U.S. 176 (1935); Slipp v. Amato, 231 Or. 512, 373 P.2d 
673 (1962), Hightower v. Bigoney, 145 So.2d 505, (Fla. 
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 156 So.2d 501; Food Pantry 
Limited v~ Waikiki Business Plaza Inc., 575 P.2d 869 (Hawaii 
1978}. 
In the trial court's sound discretion the remedies of 
equity are molded to the needs of justice and are employed 
to protect the equities of all parties. The flexibility of 
equitable jurisdiction permits innovation in remedies to 
meet all varieties of circumstances which may arise in any 
case. Ripley v. International R. of Cent. America. 8 App. 
Div. 310, 188 N.Y •. S. 2d 62, aff'd 209 N.Y.S. 2d 289, 171 
N.E. 2d 443 (1959). 
Again, the appellant in the case at bar has failed to 
show that this broad range of dis.cretion, granted to the 
trial court in equity, was abused, and therefore the 
decision of the lower court must be affirmed. 
It should be pointed out, furthermore, that the appellant's 
brief argues highly inconsistent positions. Counsel argues 
that property settlements should never be modif ied--that the 
court should make such settlement agreements "permanent, 
final and unreviewable except through normal appeal channels." 
-10-
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(See pages 6 and 7 of appellant's brief.) Appellant then 
agrees, however, that it would be proper and "only fair" to 
modify the decree through an amendment, excluding himself 
from participation in any increases in value resulting from 
improvements made by the respondent. (See pages 5 and 6 of 
appellant's brief.) Not only is the appellant's argument 
against the clear weight of authority in this state~ its 
inconsistencies also make it untenable. 
Moreover, the cases cited by the appellant in support 
of his argument are all clearly distinguishable from the 
case at bar, or stand completely different propositi9ns than 
advocated by appellant. 
The decision in Kinsey v •. J<insey, 231 Cal. App.2d 219, 
41 Cal.Rptr. 802 {196~) dealt with an interlocutory decree, 
not a final divorce decree as in the case at bar. The case 
of Sande v. Sande, 83 Idaho 233, 360 P.2d 998 ·(1961), cited 
by the appellant as stating thaf a decree should not be 
modified, in fact states: 
Where an agreement is inequitable and 
unfair to the wife, equity will not 
enforce the agreement but will grant 
relief to her even though no actual 
fraud or duress was restored to by her 
husband in procuring it. Sande, supra 
at 1003. 
The court in Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P. 
200 (1919) did not dictate the rule proscribed by the 
appellant that modification is improper in the absence of 
fraud, duress or undue influence. The requested modification 
of the decree in Hughes was not allowed because of other 
-11-
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circumstances, even though misrepresentation was shown. 
Both Irwin v. Irwin, 150 Colo. 261, 372 P.2d 440 (1962) 
and Ross v. Ross, 403 P.2d 19 (Oregon 1965) cited by appellJnt 
in his brif are based on their prospective state laws and 
statutes, which are clearly distinguishable from U.C.A. 30-
3-5. 
Respondent does not argue with. the requirement of a 
change of circumstances in order to modify a decree, as set 
forth in Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975) since, as 
stated in POINT II of this brief, the lower court in the 
.case at bar found a change of circumstances sufficient to 
modify the property settlement of the decree. 
The appellant's argument, therefore, is not substantiated 
by case law and is antithetical to the rule proscribed in 
U.C.A. 30-3-5. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE DECREE. 
It is well recognized that a change of circumstances is 
necessary in order to modify a divorce decree. Sorensen v. 
Sorensen, 20 Utah2d 360, 438 P.2d 180 (1968); Adams v. Adams, 
593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979); Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 
(Utah, 1978). Although the majority of cases which require 
a change of circumstances in order to modify a decree deal 
with alimony and child custody, the premise has also been 
applied to property distribution. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 
Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932). 
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In the case at bar, the trial court exptessly found a 
change of circumstances sufficient to modify the decree. 
The court, in its Findings of Fact '(No. 10), held that the 
reason stated by the appellant for including Paragraph 5, 
the property settlement, no longer exists. (R.20) Appellant 
testified in the court below (later contradicted on cross-
examination, see R.86) that his main reason for including 
the original property settlement in the decree, reser~ing in 
himself a lien on future appreciation of the residence, was 
to let it act as an "inducement" for the respondent, a 
native of Germany, to remain in this area (R.15,78). 
Respondent testified that she knew nothing of this agreement 
between the appellant and the parties' former attorney to 
place the particular property settlement provisions in the 
decree solely for this reason, and_ would not have agreed to 
such had she know of it. (R.99,100) 
Since the divorce decr~e was granted, the respondent 
has obtained a teaching certificate and local employment as 
a school teacher, has remained in the residef:ice for more 
than four years and lived in the United States a total of 
sixteen years. (R.52,57) Any doubts, therefore, that the 
appellant may have had as to whether the respondent would 
remain in this area, are now totally unfounded and without 
basis. The trial court, therefore, found that a change of 
circumstances did exist--the appellant's reason for includi~ 
the original property settlement was.no longer tenable or 
just. 
-1~-
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Furthermore, a change of circumstances existed by 
reason of the fact that respondent, since the divorce 
decree, had made all payments on the home, insurance and 
taxes, and had made substantial improvements to the residence, 
all without the benefit of financial assistance from the 
appellant. (R. 20,21) 
These findings come to the Supreme. Court clothed with 
verity, and should not be disturbed unless the appellant 
demonstrates that in making such findings the trial court 
abused its discretion. As mentioned in Point I, above, 
appellant has the burden of proving that the trial court's 
findings of fact and decision to modify under 30-3-5 were 
clearly erroneous, and constituted substantial, reversible 
error. Knapp v·. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 8 Utah2d 220, 
332 P.2d 662 {1958); Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 
548 P.2d 898 {Utah 1976); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974); Brunson v. 
Strong, 17 Utah2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Lee v. Howes, 
548 P.2d 619 (1976); Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah 
1974). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COST 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
The established rule in Utah is that an award of attorney's 
fees on appeal are entirely within the discretion of the. 
Supreme Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate &·Inv. Co., 3 
Utah2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); Eastman v. Eastman, 558 
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P.2d 514, 516 (Utah 1976). See also S Am.Jur.2d 445, Appeal 
& Error, §1022. In cases where the modification of a divorcie 
decree has been appealed, the Supreme Court has seen fit to 
award attorney's fees to the party who has been forced to 
follow through and defend an appeal commenced by the.opposing 
party,. This court in Kiger· v. Kiger, 29 Utah2d 167, 506 
P.2d 441 (1973), a case involving similar circumstances to 
the case at bar~ stated: 
The wife, respondent, on appeal from the 
second amended divorce decree, was en-
titled to attorney's fees and the case 
should be remanded for taking of evidence 
••• and an appropriate award of attorney's 
fe·es for services performed by the wife's 
counsel on appeal. 
See also Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 
P.2d 534 (1967). 
The case at bar is clearly within general rule described 
by this Court in Kiger, supra. Since the defendant pursued 
this appeal and plaintiff, the prevailing party, was compelled 
to respond, the cost of attorney's fees on appeal should be 
awarded to the plaintiff. See Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 
(Utah, 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Paragraph 5, the property settlement in the original 
divorce decree, was clearly in need of revision and modifi-
cation. The settlement was inequitable and unjustly allowed 
the appellant to benefit from the appreciation in value of 
property to which he was making no financial contribution. 
The trial court had continuing jurisdiction and statutory 
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power, granted by U.C.A. 30-3-5, to modify the property 
settlement in order to reflect justice between the parties. 
Furthermore, the trial court found that a change of circum-
stances did exist sufficient to justify a modification of 
the property settlement. Since the appellant has failed to 
show in any way that the trial judge abused his discretion, 
the findings and modification of .the trial court must stand, 
and the cost of attorney's fees on appeal should be awarded 
to the respondent. 
Respectfully submitted this /6-rkday of June, 1980. 
CRA~et;_{~y:::!' ff rc0 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing to Mr. Neall T. 
Wootton, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Suite 12, Geneva 
Building, American Fork, Utah, 84003, this 
---
day of June, 
1980. 
SECRe·rARY 
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